Larissa A. Symbouras

A Resurgence of Prohibition?

2010-11-22T18:30:00.003-05:00

You may have heard that alcohol-containing energy drinks have been banned by the FDA. If you haven't, check out this story and this page from the FDA. The FDA sent out warning letters to the manufacturers of those drinks, but did not direct those letters to the manufacturers of alcoholic beverages that only contain caffeine as a natural constituent of one or more of their ingredients, such as coffee flavoring. Whatever may be your opinion of the FDA's ban and its choice to step in and "protect" from themselves citizens who are legally old enough to drink, at least they made the distinction between these energy drinks they deemed "dangerous" and regular alcoholic beverages that happen to have some caffeine.

NJ is not making the same distinction. Bergen County Assemblywoman Valerie Vainieri Huttle, of Englewood, has proposed a new bit of legislation, Bill A3437. The bill has been co-sponsored by Assemblyman Ralph R. Caputo, of Belleville.

The new proposed legislation states, "No person shall knowingly sell, offer for sale, deliver, receive, or purchase for resale in this State any caffeinated alcoholic beverage. A person who violates the provisions of this section shall be liable to a civil penalty of not less than $250 for the first violation, not less than $500 for the second violation, and $1,000 for the third and each subsequent violation."

That doesn't sound terrible, until you read this: "A caffeinated alcoholic beverage is defined in the bill as any prepackaged alcoholic beverage that has been supplemented by the manufacturer with added caffeine or other stimulant that is metabolized by the body as caffeine."

That doesn't just encompass the energy drinks containing alcohol, which the FDA has deemed dangerous. That arguably encompasses every beer made with coffee or chocolate. Young's Double Chocolate Stout, for instance. My own husband brews a rather delicious stout, made with Ghirardelli cocoa powder. It may very well include Godiva and Starbucks liqueurs.

Should you wish to voice your opinion regarding this piece of legislation, you can find your legislators here, listed by municipality.

There have been some grumblings that this is the beginning of a new era of Prohibition, which, as we know, was a bad idea the first time around, in 1919. Is it? I tend to veer away from an alarmist attitude, but there's no denying the similarity of these new laws to those in the 1600s - 1800s that led to "The Noble Experiment." Even then, the original laws were on the state level, and it wasn't until the anti-alcohol political parties and lobbies gained more power on the local level in the early 1900s that the 18th Amendment prohibiting the production, sale, and consumption of alcohol on a national level was passed.

Could it happen again?

If you don't think so, you should wonder why this bill has been proposed. Note that there's another bill still pending in the NJ Assembly, one proposed prior to Ms. Huttle's bill. The first one, proposed by Assemblywoman Mary Pat Angelini of Wall Township, is A3402, which mirrors the FDA ban and specifies, "No holder of a license issued pursuant to 24 R.S.33:1-11 or R.S.33:1-12 shall knowingly sell, or offer for sale 25 any alcoholic energy drink."

Why, if this piece of legislation was already proposed and in the works, did Ms. Huttle feel the need to put forth her version? Why indeed, unless it's intended as a real move toward prohibition.

Do you think it's coming?

Motor Vehicle Commission and Surcharge Debt - Incentive Program

2010-06-15T09:41:00.000-04:00

The MVC (formerly DMV) has announced today the creation of an MVC Surcharge Payment Incentive Pogram. The program will run from today, June 15, 2010, though July 30, 2010, and is designed to help MVC customers in judgment address their surcharges.

It's a vicious cycle. If you don't pay the debt, you can't reinstate your drivers' license, but without the license, you can't legally drive to work to make the money to pay the debt.

This program is designed to wipe the slate clean or help those in judgment to arrange for more affordable payments and have their driving privileges restored. Drivers eligible for this program include those who have been placed in judgment for failing to make surcharge payments or those in judgment who have already arranged a payment plan but are having difficulties making the payments. Drivers with outstanding surcharges related to DUI or DWI convictions are not eligible for the incentive program.

There are approximately 273,000 drivers eligible for the incentive program. Examples of the incentives being offered are longer payment plans and interest waivers.

Drivers who receive a personalized letter need to contact the specific collection firm noted on the letter.

For more information, drivers with surcharge debt should visit the MVC website.

Seat Belts - Be sure to wear them!

2010-06-01T16:04:00.001-04:00

New Jersey's seat belt law has changed yet again, effective immediately. Under N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2(f) and (g), all occupants of a passenger automobile, including adults sitting in the back seat of the vehicle, must be wearing a seat belt while the vehicle is in operation.

[Note: In NJ, "operation" means once the key has been turned in the ignition, even when the vehicle is not in motion.]

There are a few exceptions to this statute including for vehicles manufactured prior to July 1, 1966; people who have doctors' notes explaining that they cannot wear seat belts for medical reasons, passenger automobiles that aren't required to have seat belts under federal law, and passenger automobiles originally constructed with fewer seat belts than seats.

A new accompanying statute, N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2(n), establishes this new provision as a "secondary statute" under New Jersey traffic law. The statute shall only be enforced, therefore, when the driver has been detained for some other suspected violation of law.

Each rear seat passenger in violation of the new statute who is over the age of eighteen shall be responsible for any fine imposed for his or her failure to wear a seat belt.

DWI Changes: An Update

2010-05-18T17:53:00.000-04:00

In January, I posted a discussion of State v. Ciancaglini here, regarding the sentencing changes in the DWI and refusal laws.

Because the decision in Ciancaglini differed so markedly from prior court decisions, it has created confusion in the courts and defense bar. Therefore, on May 7, 2010, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certiorari, and will be reviewing the Appellate Division's decision. Oral argument has not yet been scheduled.

Revoked List: Law Repealed

2010-05-12T15:39:00.000-04:00

Effective January 16, 2010, the legislature has repealed the provision of N.J.S.A. 39:40(g) which required a fine of $3,000 to be paid to the Motor Vehicle Commission when the underlying reason for the defendant's license suspension came from a failure to pay timely insurance surcharges.

This sentencing enhancement was imposed in addition to all other penalties and was collected by the MVC. The penalty was automatically reduced to a judgment against the defendant until paid in full.

Defendants who were assessed this fine since January 16th of this year should make an application for sentence reconsideration pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 7:9-4.

What does this mean?

Previously, if you were found guilty of or plead guilty to driving while suspended, and the suspension had occurred because you owed insurance surcharges, you were automatically assessed this extra $3,000 penalty. That part of the law has been repealed, so any instances of this after January 16, 2010, should be altered to comport with the statute as it now reads.

It won't be automatically reversed, so you need to make an application to the court. Be sure to contact your attorney for help.

Also, follow up with the Motor Vehicle Commission and the credit reporting bureaus to ensure that the judgment will not show up on your credit history.

Why is Divorce Expensive?

2010-05-12T12:08:00.000-04:00

I just spoke with a friend this morning whose parents divorced several years ago, and she relayed a joke her father told her:

Why is divorce so expensive?
Because it's worth it!

It is funny; the truth often is. He's right, generally speaking. Once a couple has exhausted all other avenues of recourse and still comes to the conclusion that it's time to end the marriage, then the divorce is worth it, even though it is indeed an expensive endeavor. In the end, if things can be handled well by the parties involved, everyone is better off for it, the couple, their families, their children. Living apart can be better than living in strife. Many, many years ago I had a friend whose parents actually became best friends after they divorced. Now, that's not typical, of course, but it's an indication of how much better off they were once the stresses of the relationship were removed.

But what makes a divorce so expensive?

Ah, that's what you really want to know, isn't it? Why is it so expensive? There are a lot of factors involved.

We as attorneys cannot ethically do a divorce on a contingency basis the way we can a personal injury matter. That means we're not actually allowed to let you pay us based on how much money you get out of the settlement or trial. We're directed by the rules of ethics to charge an hourly rate. There's your first factor: your attorney's hourly rate. Generally speaking, hourly fees are commensurate with experience and expertise. That's not to say that a new young lawyer with a lower rate isn't a terrific attorney; they absolutely can be. Just do your research before choosing an attorney. As much as it may hurt, it's better to base your decision on referrals from other pleased clients and your own comfort level with the attorney than on the fees alone. In the end, a good attorney could save you thousands down the road.

Another factor is the extent of complications present in your life. A divorce involving a custody dispute is necessarily more expensive than one in which the parties agree on custody and visitation or one that doesn't involve children at all. A divorce with two W-2 wage earners is less expensive than one in which a business owner is involved and the business needs to be evaluated for equitable distribution.

The other factors, though, are more difficult to anticipate.

One is the attorney your spouse chooses. If the attorneys can work well together to reach a settlement beneficial to both parties, your divorce will be less expensive than if one party chooses an attorney who is overly litigious, gives bad advice to his client, or is simply unfamiliar with the law.

And the rest is up to you and your spouse. The expense of a divorce depends heavily on how much you are willing to compromise. To keep it as inexpensive as possible, determine from the outset what is most important to you and what is least important. Tell your attorney these things, so that he or she can strategize accordingly.

My experience has run the gamut, from the least expensive divorce that was completed in two court appearances to the most expensive that involved a full three-week trial, domestic violence hearings, several arrests and the resulting municipal court appearances, expert witnesses, business evaluations, and involvement with children's services.

An anecdote:

Very early in my career, when I was just a few months out of my clerkship, I was handed a file by my boss. The case was near the end, and I appeared in court with our client at a settlement conference at which we settled every issue... except one. It was a bill from the parties' accountant, for $500. At the time, my boss was billing my time at $125/hour, so four hours of my time would total the same $500. My client, the marriage's breadwinner, was adamant that he would not pay it. His wife honestly didn't have the money to pay it herself. It was marital debt. While I will never permit my client to buckle under on an issue when I think he's wrong to do so and I think he's being unfair to himself, in this instance my advice was to just pay the bill and cut his losses. He refused. He'd rather pay me than the bill. It was only when my boss, an experienced attorney who'd been practicing more than 50 years, agreed with me, that our client finally agreed.

A stance like that is what will make your divorce most exorbitant. If it's something worth fighting for, like your children, by all means fight. Just choose your battles wisely. Not all divorces have to be exceptionally expensive. The ones that are should be the ones that are worth it.

Control and Domestic Violence

2010-03-29T16:12:00.000-04:00

An interesting discussion arose recently when a woman posed a question about dealing with her fiance's behavior. She called him "jealous." What most of us saw in her description, even those who'd never had experience with domestic violence, was control. That's what domestic violence is about, after all. It doesn't occur because someone likes to hit people; it occurs because someone wants to control someone else. It's not just a loss of temper, either. Most abusers aren't going around beating up their bosses. Oh, no, they save it for those closest to them - their significant others, their children, sometimes even their parents, especially if the parents are elderly. People they can control.

Since it's about control, domestic violence isn't always physical. It can be more insidious than that, mental and emotional abuse that can do more damage than a slap to the face.

In the case of this woman who posed the question about her fiance, she described him as someone who's "always been very jealous." This man, who she says makes her feel like the most important person in the world, forces her to tell him if she thinks that anyone else besides him is attractive. He used to ask her if she'd "been being good." Her fiance won't go to therapy regarding his issues, because he "doesn't believe in it." He tried it once before and "said it didn't work." He has called her "whorish." In the past, when she found someone attractive, he got angry at her and yelled at her. Most recently, he "got sad" when she found someone else attractive.

His jealousy frustrates her, and this is her response: "I know that what I'm doing seems wrong and I've volunteered to go to counseling... I don't often think of other men and [my fiance and I] spend almost every minute we don't work together." Still, the issue flares up every month or so.

Meanwhile, she moved out of her parents' house a year ago because her mom was reading her texts, thereby finding out that she was sexually active at age 20. This, she deemed "extremely abusive." Even though her parents insisted that they would not try to break up the couple, this woman was "sure they would have." Later, the woman says that she told her fiance she left her family and moved to another state "for him." She's told him she's given him everything she has. Without her parents' support, she's had to leave school and works two jobs while her fiance completes his degree and works one job.

She believes they'd have no place to go if they broke up.

This is textbook stuff. I've been working with victims of domestic violence since 1989, and these are the red flags I see:

First, abusers will cut their victims off from their friends and family. They will convince the victims that their families hate them and won't accept them back, they convince them that their families are conspiring against them. They make themselves their victims' sole support system. They take the victims out of school - an education is dangerous. They stunt their victims' educations and careers to make them more dependent on the abusers.

Then, the control. This guy wanted to know all of his fiancee's thoughts and punish her for them. He made her feel wrong for having perfectly normal thoughts. He has her believing she's somehow evil for looking at or even thinking about another man. He has made her uncomfortable in her own skin and has her believing there is something wrong with her; enough that she's willing to go to counseling to fix herself for him.

The name-calling. And she accepts it as deserved.

The end result is that the victim comes to believe that she needs her abuser and has nowhere to go. She thinks her family won't take her back. She has no friends. Her education is incomplete and her career stunted. Plus, her brain doesn't work properly and she's a whore. She needs him. He's got her trapped. The thing is, he's got her trapped with lies. She could go back to her family, to a friend, to a shelter. She could leave and get out... before getting married, before kids, before it becomes more difficult.

If you are this girl, get out. If you were this girl, and now you're married, now there are kids, now it's more difficult... get out anyway. It's never too late. I once met a woman in her 70s who'd been married for 50 years to an abusive husband before she finally got up the courage and scavenged enough dropped change from the couch cushions to take the bus to the courthouse and file a complaint for domestic violence.

If she can, you can.

If you are a victim of domestic violence, get help. Call the National Domestic Violence Hotline at 1-800-799-SAFE (7233) or TTY at 1-800-787-3224.

New Interlock Law for DWI

2010-01-16T17:07:00.003-05:00

A revision, dubbed "Ricci's Law," to the current DWI statute revises ignition interlock device requirements for certain offenders. This law has passed the legislature and is awaiting the signature of Governor Corzine.

Ricci Branca was a south Jersey teen who was riding his bicycle with friends when he was struck and killed by a drunk driver. Two of the other cyclists were injured. The drunk driver, who'd had at least 10 drinks before getting behind the wheel and who had a BAC of over .30, is now serving a 16-year sentence for aggravated manslaughter and related charges.

An ignition interlock device is a mechanism installed into a vehicle's dashboard. It works like a breathalyzer, and prevents the vehicle from starting if a BAC (blood alcohol concentration), usually between .02 and .04 is registered. Many studies have shown that interlock devices assist to prevent drunk driving and are effective in combating repeat offenses of DWI. I am not going to dispute those studies, although the device is not foolproof and requires maintenance.

The DWI statute in NJ, as it stands now, provides that a judge may order the installation of an ignition interlock device for six to twelve months for first offenses. For second, third, and subsequent offenses, judges must order the installation of an interlock device for one to three years or suspend all license plates and registration certificates for two years (for a second offense) or ten years (for a third or subsequent offense).

Those registration suspensions run concurrently with the required license suspension of the offender; two years for a second offense, and ten years for a third, and affect only vehicles owned by the defendant or registered to him. They are a current alternative to the installation of the interlock device.

With the revision, the bottom first-offense tier would not be altered. A person convicted of DWI with a BAC of at least .08 but less than .10 would be subject to the same penalties as previously.

However, a first-offense DWI conviction with a BAC of .10 or higher would now require the installation of an interlock device in the vehicle principally operated by the offender, no matter who the owner.* The installation would be required for six to twelve months after the period of drivers license suspension expires.

A first-offence DWI conviction with a BAC of .15 or higher has the same requirement, except that the installation must occur during the period of license suspension and extend six to twelve months thereafter.

For a second DWI conviction, the judge's option to suspend a person's registration for two years concurrent with the required license suspension would be eliminated, and the interlock installation during the two-year period of license suspension and for one to three years thereafter would be required.

For a third DWI conviction, the judge's option to suspend a person's registration for ten years concurrent with the required license suspension would be eliminated, and the interlock installation for the ten-year period of suspension and for one to three years thereafter would be mandatory.

Note: This new interlock requirement will also apply to convictions for refusal to submit to a breath test.

*This means that if a vehicle you own and which is registered to you and used by you is also the principal vehicle of your spouse, parent, child, sibling, roommate, friend, partner, girlfriend, or boyfriend your vehicle will require the installation of the device and you will be required to use the device to start your ignition for the entirety of the period of installation, anywhere from six months to thirteen years. Be careful! This means that the vehicle may not start if you (the non-offender owner or driver of the vehicle) are using it and have a glass of wine or a beer with dinner. These interlock devices are sensitive and will also register a BAC if you have recently (within the past 15-20 minutes) used mouthwash or a breath spray containing alcohol.

DWI, Refusal, and New Sentencing Problem

2010-01-09T14:19:00.000-05:00

State v. Ciancaglini, January 7, 2010 - A discussion
[Full text of the decision here.]

The facts in brief:  The defendant was stopped for traffic offenses in May of 2008. After breathalyzer testing showed a blood alcohol level of 0.17%, she pleaded guilty to DWI in September of 2008.

The defendant had a prior DWI conviction from 1979 and a conviction for refusal to take a breathalyzer test in 2006.

The municipal court sentenced the defendant as a third-time offender, subjecting her to six months in jail, a fine of $1,006, ten-year loss of her driver's license and vehicle registration, and other penalties. She filed an appeal with the Law Division of the Superior Court, which decided that the 2006 refusal conviction could not be considered the same as a prior DWI conviction. Because the 1979 conviction was more than ten yares earlier, the statute called for the defendant to be sentenced as a first-time offender under the DWI statute. She was sentenced to thirty days in jail, a $500 fine, and a one-year suspension of her driver's license, plus the other requisite penalties.

At this time, the defendant has already served the thirty-day jail sentence.

The issues:  Can a defendant with a prior conviction for refusing to take a breathalyzer be subjected to the enhanced penalties facing a multiple-offender when she is later convicted of driving while intoxicated? Does the right against double jeopardy prohibit the imposition of an increased sentence where the defendant has already served the lesser sentence?

The court's holidng:  Previously, the Appellate Division had held that a conviction for refusal would not count as a prior offense with regard to sentencing for later DWI convictions and would not result in enhanced penalties.

The sentence for a refusal to submit to a breath test is essentially the same as the sentence for DWI itself. You should know that if you are convicted of both refusal and DWI as a result of a single traffic stop, those two charges and sentences are no longer merged; you can be convicted of both and are subject to both sentences.

While I do understand and support the State's interest in removing drunk drivers from the streets, and I do understand the frustration of law enforcement officials when a suspect refuses a breath test when there is suspected DWI, I have some issues with the penalties for refusal. On the one hand, the law says that an intoxicated person is incapable of taking marital vows, entering into a contract, entering into a divorce property settlement agreement, or taking a number of other actions. On the other hand, the traffic code holds allegedly intoxicated people responsible, with severe penalties, for a decision made (refusal) during the state of intoxication.

While conviction under the refusal statute does not result in a period of incarceration, the fines and license suspension periods are parallel to those for DWI and increase comparably with convictions subsequent to a first offense of either refusal or DWI.

Previously, the Appellate Division treated refusal as a civil-type offense, holding that the standard of proof was merely a "preponderance of the evidence," rather than the stricter "beyond a reasonable doubt" afforded criminal cases. However, that was rejected by the NJ Supreme court, which determined that the offense was quasi-criminal in nature, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and affording it the protection of the bar against double jeopardy.

For these reasons, because a DWI conviction enhances penalties for a subsequent refusal, and because refusal is now treated as a quasi-criminal charge rather than civil, the Appellate Division has now determined that the refusal offense and DWI offense are interchangeable enough that a conviction for refusal counts as a "prior conviction" when calculating whether a subsequent DWI is a first, second, or third offense for sentencing purposes.

Therefore, the defendant's September 2008 conviction for DWI was her third offense.

The guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits multiple sentences for the same offense, but does not permit a defendant to serve only a lesser sentence imposed based upon an error of law.

Although the reduced sentence imposed by the Law Division was not an illegal sentence based upon an error of law, because it was imposed based upon a prior decision of the Appellate Division, the court stated that it need not address the double jeopardy issue in this case. The Law Division's sentence was not the only sentence imposed, and defendant's double jeopardy rights are not violated by the return to an original sentence imposed by the municipal court and mistakenly decreased by the Law Division.

Because the sentence reduction was based upon a finding of law, not facts, by an intermediate court after defendant's appeal, defendant also did not have an expectation of finality regarding the reduced sentence.

The end result:  The matter was remanded to the Law Division for the imposition of the original sentence imposed by the municipal court. The defendant will have to serve the remainder of the six months in jail, lose her license and vehicle registration for ten years, and pay enhanced fines and penalties according to her third-time offender status.

What does all of this mean to you?  If you are convicted of refusal to submit to a breath test pursuant to a DWI stop, and later are convicted of a DWI, even if you are not convicted of DWI at the time of the refusal conviction, and even if a first DWI is never proven or admitted in any court, the later DWI conviction will be treated as a second or subsequent offense for sentencing purposes.

This may seem unjust, and I agree. You can be sentenced as a second or third offender without first been convicted of an initial DWI.

The smartest thing? Do not refuse a breath test. In fifteen years of doing defense work, I have never seen it help anyone's case, only increase the number of charges they are facing and make their lives more difficult.

"Escorts" and the Domestic Violence Act

2009-12-14T14:38:00.004-05:00

J.S. v. J.F., December 10, 2009 - A Discussion
[Full text of the decision here.]

The facts in brief:  The plaintiff worked as a dancer at several clubs where defendant was a patron, and defendant occasionally paid plaintiff to be his paid escort. They went out on several occasions, including once when the defendant took the plaintiff to his parents' house for Thanksgiving. After the plaintiff began seeing someone, the defendant began to threaten the plaintiff and her boyfriend with bodily harm and deportation. The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order based on terroristic threats and harassment on December 2, 2008. Eight days later, after a final hearing, the judge issued a final restraining order.

The issues:  Does the plaintiff qualify as a victim of domestic violence in the context of the parties' relationship, although the defendant paid for her company?

The court's holding:  The New Jersey Domestic Violence Act outlines the state's definition of domestic violence and the parameters under which relief can be granted. Not anyone can obtain a restraining order against anyone else in the New Jersey Family Court.

[For instance, you can't go to Family Court to get a restraining order against your neighbor or some guy at work, even if he smacked you in the head with a baseball bat. There is other relief available in the criminal and civil courts for cases like that, but not in family court.]

The protected classes of people under the Domestic Violence Act are spouses, former spouses, and any present or former household member of the defendant, anyone with whom the defendant has a child in common, or anyone with whom the defendant has had a dating relationship. The Act, however, has not defined the term "dating relationship," and has left it to the courts to make that determination on a case-by-case basis. The only precedent for the Appellate Division to consider in this matter was a single 2003 case, decided at the trial court level. The holding of a lower court is not binding on the Appellate Division, but is merely advisory. In the 2003 case, the judge suggested several factors to consider in determining the existence of a dating relationship: Minimal social bonding of the parties, above and beyond the casual, how, long the alleged dating relationship existed prior to the acts of domestic violence, the nature and frequency of the parties' interactions, the parties' individual or joint expectations with respect to the relationship, the parties' affirmation to others of their relationship by statement or conduct, and any other reasons unique to the case in question that support or detract from a finding that a "dating relationship" exists.

The Appellate Division declined to use the test outlined in that case, but agreed with the 2003 trial court's reasoning that "the facts should be liberally construed in favor of finding a dating relationship because the Act itself is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislative intent to eradicate domestic violence. Stated another way, the Act embodies a strong public policy against domestic violence. Because the Act is remedial in nature, it has been liberally construed for teh protection of victims of domestic violence. Indeed, the Act itself announces that its purpose is 'to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.'" As the Appellate Division stated, "These principles would not be served by a cramped interpretation of what constitutes a dating relationship."

In considering the scope of the Act, the Appellate Division rejected the defendant's contention that a relationship that includes a payment in consideration for the other's time precludes the finding of a dating relationship.

[The court went so far as to say that an au pair or live-in housekeeper would qualify under the Act as a protected class as someone who "is a present or former household member." Financial benefit from the relationship does not automatically preclude legal benefits under the Act.]

The key consideration is what the particular parties involved would view as a "date," which can vary from couple to couple, group to group, generation to generation. No matter what, the courts should be careful to consider the parties' own understanding of their relationship.

Here, the defendant contradicted himself with regard to this issue, asserting that the relationship was merely "professional," while also stating that he gave the plaintiff money to help her out. He did not object when the judge classified the relationship as "dating." The plaintiff maintained throughout her testimony that they were boyfriend and girlfriend.

The end result:  The Appellate Division refused to vacate plaintiff's restraining order against defendant. Plaintiff has a permanent Final Restraining Order.

What does all of this mean to you?  If you are a victim of violence, do not think that recourse is not available to you simply because you are in some semblance of a business relationship with your abuser. If your situation is akin to the one described here, or if you are an in-home, full-time employee of the abuser or the abuser's family member, you may very well be entitled to a domestic violence restraining order and the protections with which it comes. Definitely contact the police and/or an attorney for advice and assistance.

New Law - Immunity for Underage Drinking in Certain Circumstances

2009-10-03T00:04:00.006-04:00

New law: The governor’s has signed into law an amendment to NJSA 2C:33-15 that will provide statutory immunity to certain individuals who consume alcoholic beverages while under the legal age to do so.

NJSA 2C:33-15 generally prohibits either the consumption or possession of an alcoholic beverage by a person under the age of 21. The offense is a disorderly persons’ offense and carries a minimum fine of $500. Conviction also requires a six-month suspension of driving privileges when the offense occurs in a motor vehicle.

Under the amendment that goes into effect today, a statutory immunity will apply when:

(1) one of the underage persons called 9-1-1 and reported that another underage person was in need of medical assistance due to alcohol consumption; (2) the underage person who called 9-1-1 and, if applicable, one or two other persons acting in concert with the underage person who called 9-1-1 provided each of their names to the 9-1-1 operator; (3) the underage person was the first person to make the 9-1-1 report; and (4) the underage person and, if applicable, one or two other persons acting in concert with the underage person who made the 9-1-1 call remained on the scene with the person under the legal age in need of medical assistance until assistance arrived and cooperated with medical assistance and law enforcement personnel on the scene. The underage person who received medical assistance also shall [also] be immune from prosecution under NJSA 2C:33-15.The amendment is intended to encourage the intervention of emergency rescue personnel in instances where intoxication has resulted in illness.

What does this mean to you or your child? If you or your child has consumed alcohol while under the age of 21 and is with another person under 21 who has consumed alcohol and requires medical attention, you or your child (and friends) should not fear calling 911 to get help for the sick friend. The person reporting, person who is ill, and any friends who are there with them will be immune from prosecution under this statute if, and only if, they call 911, are the first to report the illness to 911, stay with the sick friend until help arrives, and cooperate with medical personnel and police on the scene.

Equitable Distribution and Inheritance

2009-10-01T00:42:00.012-04:00

Daphne Speck-Bartynski v. Robert Bartynski - A Discussion

[Unpublished Decision of the Appellate Division - Decided September 25, 2009]

The facts in brief: After twenty-two years of marriage and raising two adult children, the parties divorced on July 23, 2008. At the time of the divorce, the husband earned $115,000 per year and the wife was a full-time homemaker.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, providing for permanent alimony in the amount of slightly more than $30,000 per year. The parties also agreed to the majority of equitable distribution, including valuations on property, custody, parenting time, and child support. Only one issue with regard to equitable distribution remained.

In 1998, the husband received an inheritance, the majority of which was commingled with marital funds. It was used to purchase investment accounts and the parties' summer home. After the complaint for divorce was filed, the wife used a portion of the funds to purchase her post-marital home, an "advance" on equitable distribution according to the settlement agreement. In addition, a portion was lent to the wife's brother, some deposited in a bank account, and $120,000 was used by the wife to pay down the mortgage on the marital home.

The payment of the mortgage spurred the husband to curtail the wife's access to the funds by requiring two signatures on all large withdrawals. He sought to preserve the funds for the parties' children and grandchildren.

The issue before the trial court was the percentage of property allocated to each of the parties. Following a hearing, the court ruled that the fair market value of the summer home, the money used to pay off the marital home mortgage, and the balance of the loan owed by the wife's brother were to be divided equally.

The other assets purchased with the inheritance funds, the two investment accounts, the bank account, and the fair market value of the wife's post-marital home, would be divided with 2/3 going to the husband and 1/3 going to the wife. It is from this portion of the court's decision that the wife appealed.

The issues: Should the assets purchased with the commingled inheritance funds have been divided equally?

The court's holding: The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.

The general rule is that an inheritance is not subject to equitable distribution. Had the husband kept these funds separate from marital funds, they would have been his alone at the time of divorce. However, because the funds were commingled with marital monies, they do become subject to equitable distribution. That said, the trial court is permitted to allocate some weighted amount of distribution, as it did here.

The trial court has broad discretion regarding the division of marital assets, and its determination cannot be touched by an appellate court as long as the trial court could have reasonably reached its result from the evidence presented. The appellate courts cannot disturb the division just because it is unequal, unless a legal or factual mistake has been made. It is the moving party, in this case the wife, who bears the burden of proving an abuse of discretion.

In this case, the trial judge considered all of the necessary statutory elements with regard to equitable distribution, as well as the evidence, and could have reasonably placed significance on the husband's much larger contribution to marital assets through inheritance, as well as his intention to limit the wife's use of those assets as demonstrated by the change to the signature requirement. There was nothing permitting the Appellate Division to interfere.

The end result: The distribution of assets remained as the trial judge had directed.

What does all of this mean to you? While an inheritance belongs solely to the heir for purposes of equitable distribution, if funds are commingled, they can be distributed between the parties. However, the non-heir party cannot necessarily expect that he or she will receive a full 50% of a commingled inheritance.

Jail Credit

2009-09-21T02:26:00.001-04:00

State v. Allen - A discussion

[Unpublished Decision of the Appellate Division - Decided September 18, 2009]

The facts in brief: The defendant pled guilty in Middlesex County to second-degree robbery pursuant to an agreement with the State. He was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment, one year less than the sentence the State recommended, subject to the No Early Release Act. Also pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentence was concurrent with a sentence the defendant was already serving in Mercer County, for another second-degree robbery. He was awarded "gap time" credits for the 97-day period between his sentencing in the two counties.

[Gap time is relevant when a defendant, who has been sentenced previously to a term of imprisonment, is sentenced again for a different offense committed prior to the imposition of the earlier sentence. In that circumstance, the defendant is credited at the time of the second sentence for the time of imprisonment served on the prior sentence.]

He was arrested for and confined pursuant to the Mercer County charge between January 20, 2005, and his sentencing in Mercer County on March 10, 2006, and was therefore awarded jail credits for those 415 days as time served on the Mercer County sentence. On January 28, 2005, eight days after he was arrested and confined in Mercer County, he was arrested for the Middlesex County robbery. Because he was already confined on the Mercer County charge, the judge did not award jail credits against the Middlesex County sentence.

Defendant did not appeal from the judgment of conviction, but instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming entitlement to jail credits against his Middlesex County sentence. The trial judge denied the petition.

The issues: The defendant raised five issues on appeal: (1) Should he have been given jail time credit against his Middlesex County sentence from January 28, 2005, through March 10, 2006, in addition to the 97 days' gap time? (2) Was the sentence imposed illegal? (3) Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel, resulting in his guilty plea? (4) Should the PCR (post-conviction relief) Court have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine the issues raised in defendant's post-conviction relief petition? (5) Is reversal required because of the cumulative effects of the errors during the sentencing hearing and the ineffectiveness of appointed trial counsel?

The court's holding: The arguments raised in Points 2, 4, and 5 lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. The arguments raised in Point 3 was not raised at the trial level, and therefore cound not be considered on appeal.

The trial court's decision regarding sentencing was affirmed.

The Appellate Division determined that the trial court did not err by declining to exercise discretion and award duplicate jail credits to the Middlesex County sentence that had already been awarded against the Mercer County sentence. Although neither the Criminal Code nor the Court Rules address the propriety of duplicating jail credits in this fashion, jail credits are generally understood to apply only to confinement attributable to the offense that gave rise to the sentence, and impermissible if the confinement is due to the service of a prior-imposed sentence or another charge. Because the defendant's confinement as of January 20, 2005, was attributable to the charge pending in Mercer County, the trial court's refusal to award them against the Middlesex County sentence was consistent with precedent. It also did not deprive the defendant of the benefit of his plea agreement, which was for concurrent sentencing, not sentences that would end on the same date.

The end result: The defendant had to serve his sentences as set forth by the trial judges in Mercer and Middlesex Counties, with the sentences running concurrently but the Middlesex County sentence ending at a later date than that in Mercer County.

What does all of this mean to you: If you are already in jail pending trial on two separate charges at the same time, pursuant to two separate offenses, your "time served" jail credits can only be awarded against one of the sentences, the one pertaining to the offense for which you were actually being held in custody.

Appellate Review, Business Ownership, and Support

2009-09-19T14:44:00.000-04:00

Catherine Romania v. Nicholas Mattera - A Discussion

[Unpublished Decision of the Appellate Division - Decided September 4, 2009]

The facts in brief: After 17 years of marriage, Romania filed a complaint for divorce on May 10, 1999. The parties had five children, aged fourteen, eleven, nine, seven, and four at the time the complaint was filed.

The divorce was contentious, including domestic violence complaints, municipal court complaints for interference with custody and harassment, and claims of malicious prosecution. The parties retained a psychologist and psychiatrist to assist in determining the best custody and visitation arrangement for the children, one of whom described the children's situation as living in a "war zone."

The trial regarding financial issues ancillary to the divorce was conducted separately after a failed attempt at mediation.

Both parties were attorneys. After the children were born, Romania became a partner in Mattera’s firm, later leaving to work part-time in another firm for an hourly wage. Mattera continued to run his own law firm. He did not keep the finances separate, instead paying household bills and expenses directly from the firm’s account and intermingling the funds.

The firm’s income fluctuated throughout the years. Romania retained two experts to determine the actual disposable income from the business for the purpose of evaluating alimony and child support, and Mattera one.

The parties stipulated to the value of the marital home and that Romania’s share of Mattera’s $1.8 million dollar law firm was $627,000. The parties also had several investment accounts.

The trial court ordered that Mattera pay permanent alimony, child support for the five children, health insurance for the children, and two thirds of the college expenses. The court also ordered an equal division of assets, subject to several debits and credits. One such credit was to Romania for one half of $330,000, the sum withdrawn by Mattera from his profit-sharing account. Mattera was not granted credit for funds Romania withdrew from accounts which was used to pay for major repairs on the marital residence and litigation expenses. The trial court explained that it considered Mattera’s share of those withdrawals to be Mattera’s contributio to Romania’s litigation expenses, in effect ordering that Mattera pay some of Romania’s counsel fees. It also acknowledged that the funds used to repair the residence increased its value, thereby increasing the amount Mattera and Romania would both receive with regard to equitable distribution. The court also directed additional credits for Romania, including one half of the tax she paid on joint assets for several years and one half of Mattera’s vehicle. A credit was given to Mattera to reimburse him the full payment he made to an escrow account. Both parties were denied other requested credits.

The court also determined custody and visitation.

The issues: Was the court biased, having an impact on it’s discretionary determinations regarding custody and parenting time, alimony, child support, and equitable distribution?

The court's holding: Affirmed in part, and remanded for reconsideration of alimony, child support, and college expenses.

The trial court had expressed concern that the children were being damaged by the actions and hostility of both parties, simply reflecting the observations of all the professionals involved in the custody recommendations and determination. Beyond that, the judge was obligated to, and did, make findings of credibility.

Because the judgment of the trial court concerning custody and parenting time was based on findings of fact adequately supported by the credible evidence, and because the review of the Appellate Division is limited to solely determining whether the findings of fact could reasonably have been reached based on that evidence, it could not alter the judgment. The Appellate Division is forbidden from undertaking an independent analysis of the trial court record or making it’s own credibility findings.

The standard for appellate review of a trial judge’s determinations regarding equitable distribution is one of “abuse of discretion.” The Appellate Division cannot “disturb decisions that have reasonable support in the record as a whole and are consistent with the law.” The question is whether the “division is clearly unfair or unjustly distorted by a misconception of law or findings of fact that are contrary to the evidence.” The Appellate Division cannot, in essence, hold a new trial, and so the decision will be affirmed even if the court would not have made the same division of assets as the trial judge.

The denial of additional credits to Mattera was not an abuse of discretion resulting in an unfair division of assets, according to the Appellate Division, given the financial circumstances of the parties and the likelihood that Romania would have been awarded pretrial counsel fees.

It was also not an abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to award Romania interest on her share of Mattera’s law practice, since during that same period of time, she has use of the marital residence and significant assets, a portion of which were later awarded to Mattera. The use of those assets were used in lieu of the interest she demanded.

The standard used by the Appellate Division to review alimony and child support awards is also “abuse of discretion.” If the decision has reasonable support in the record, the Appellate Division cannot touch it.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court’s determination that Mattera’s net income approximated $778,000 per year had no support in the record. The trial court relied upon the testimony of Mattera’s accountant, who assumed unreasonably and contrary to the history of the firm’s finances, that the law firm’s receipts and expenses would remain constant throughout the year. The Appellate Division also found that the evidence would permit a finding of net business revenue higher than that reported, but that business revenue cannot be equated with net income available to Mattera. The Appellate Division therefore found that both support orders were based upon a mistaken foundation, requiring remand to the trial court for an additional determination.

The end result: The Appellate Division upheld most of the judgment of the trial court, and so equitable distribution and custody were not altered. The issues that were determined by Mattera’s disposable income, those of child support, alimony, and college payments, were sent back to the trial court for a new trial.

What does all of this mean to you? Although you may not be happy with the trial court determinations regarding your divorce, the Appellate Division is very limited in its ability to make changes. The higher courts cannot re-try your case, or make credibility determinations, they can only determine whether, under the standards dictated by the specific issue in question, the trial court made such a large error that the decision must be overturned.

In addition, if you or your spouse owns a business, even when the business and personal funds and expenses are intermingled, the income of the business is not equivalent to the income of the person, and cannot be used outright for determination of support amounts.

Equitable Distribution and Child Support

2009-09-03T01:25:00.014-04:00

Nancy M. Hreha-Coloccia v. Leonard Coloccia - A Discussion

[Unpublished Decision of the Appellate Division - Decided September 2, 2009]

The facts in brief: After twenty years of marriage, the parties were divorced on March 3, 2008. Two daughters were born of the marriage, aged 18 and 20 as of the date of the Appellate Division's opinion.

Before the parties were married, the husband owned a house in Clifton, that he bought while the parties were dating. He put down a deposit of $60,000 to $80,000, with no financial contribution from the wife. The parties lived in that house from their marriage in October of 1987, until 1999, when they sold the house to purchase a home for $206,000 in Branchville, NJ.

Shortly after the parties were married, the wife discovered that the husband owed $10,000 to the IRS. She paid part of this debt from settlement proceeds from a car accident. Later, in 2003, the husband failed to report a withdrawal from his IRA on his tax returns, causing another tax liability, which was then paid from joint funds. In 2005 and 2006, the wife filed separate income tax returns; the husband did not file tax returns.

At some point during the marriage, a TV satellite company damaged the roof of the marital home, resulting in a $3,800 settlement to the parties. When the husband's support obligation had not yet commenced, the wife used $200 of those funds to make other repairs to the house and the balance to pay the mortgage, taxes, and shelter expenses for herself and the parties' daughters in September of 2005.

From August 2007 to February 2008, the older daughter lived with the husband.

After trial, the judge required both parties to file joint state and federal income tax returns for the years 2005 - 2007. In addition, he set the husband's child support arrears at $3,793.67, but gave the husband credit of $910 for the months when the older daughter resided with him, $1,800 for his 50% interest in the settlement with the TV satellite company, and $1,000 for the husband's 50% interest in two joint bank accounts, reducing the amount of arrears to $83.67.

The issues: Was the judge's ruling with respect to equitable distribution of the marital home, awarding her 45% of the equity, plain error? Did the judge improperly reduce the child support arrears due from the husband pursuant to a pendente lite order? Could the court compel the parties to file joint tax returns for 2007 and amended joint tax returns for 2005 and 2006, or was this plain error?

The court's holding: Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The judge's ruling with regard to the equitable distribution of the marital home should not be disturbed. The standard of plain error requires that the trial judge's decision remain undisturbed if there is sufficient credible evidence on the record to support it. Property allocation, specifically, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, requiring a finding that the decision was made without rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.

Here, because the husband used substantial premarital assets to purchase the Clifton home, and the proceeds from the sale of the Clifton home were used to purchase the Branchville home, although it was nine years before the parties were divorced, it was reasonable for the trial court to award her a smaller portion of the equity in the home than the husband, where she made no financial contribution to the purchase of the Clifton home.

The judge partially improperly reduced the husband's obligation for child support arrears. Because the New Jersey statutes prohibit the retroactive modification of child support obligations, the $910 credit for the period of time the parties' older daughter lived with the father was impermissible. The other two credits were permissible as payments from the husband's assets toward his child support obligation.

It was plain error for the court to order the filing of joint tax returns, in light of the husband's history of underestimating his income to the IRS, and the fact that the wife had already filed tax returns for those years, it would be unfair to force the wife to risk exposure to another tax liability because of the husband's failure to file and pay.

The end result: The wife received 45% of the equity in the marital home as equitable distribution of that asset. The husband's child support arrears obligation was adjusted to $993.67. The wife was permitted to file her own separate 2007 tax return and to refrain from filing amended joint tax returns for 2005 and 2006.

What does all of this mean to you? If you contribute the entirety, or possibly even large majority, of the funds to purchase the marital home, it is likely that you can and will receive a partial credit for those funds during equitable distribution.

If you are obligated to pay child support, but the custody arrangement alters and your child or children reside, even temporarily, primarily with you, you should file an application in court to amend the child support order. Should you wait, the child support obligation cannot be amended retroactively, and you will still be obligated to pay the full amount of support despite the change in residence.

Although the court will often order parties to file joint tax returns to maximize their potential refund or minimize their potential tax liability, the court will not force you to risk a greater liability due to the wrongdoing of your spouse, if proof exists.

Mandatory Joinder

2009-08-29T12:06:00.014-04:00

State of New Jersey v. Louis E. Veney, Jr. - A Discussion

The facts in brief: The defendant was arrested after an officer observed a "marijuana blunt" in his vehicle's console and the defendant told him there was a weapon in the car.

The grand jury indicted the defendant for third-degree "unlawful possession of a weapon" (Count 1), fourth-degree "hindering apprehension" (Count 2), second-degree "certain persons not to have a weapon" (Count 3). The state also charged defendant under separate complaint-summons with disorderly persons offenses of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, and with two traffic offenses, operating a vehicle with a suspended drivers license and operating a motor vehicle while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance.

Prior to trial, the State moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, with no objection from the defendant. This confirmed a letter previously sent to defense counsel indicating the State's intention to dismiss those counts. The court indicated an intention to dismiss the two counts after the jury was impaneled and sworn. After the jury was sworn, the State did not move again to dismiss the counts, but the trial proceeded only on Count 3 with regard to this defendant.

The jury found defendant guilty of Count 3, "certain persons not to have a weapon." The judge granted defendant’s motion of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. At the same hearing, the defendant pled guilty, upon the advice of his attorney and pursuant to a plea agreement, to Count 1 in exchange for state recommending 4 years prison with 18 month period of parole ineligibility, dismissal of Count 2 and dismissal of the disorderly persons and traffic offenses.

The court sentenced the defendant according to the plea agreement.

The issues: Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel? Was the State precluded from seeking the defendant's conviction on Count 1 of the indictment pursuant to the bar against double jeopardy? Was the State precluded from seeking the defendant's conviction on Count 1 of the indictment pursuant to the mandatory joinder rule?

The court's holding: The state was barred from prosecuting the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon under the mandatory joinder rule, as well as the doctrine of fundamental fairness. The defense attorney should have sought dismissal of the charge prior to defendant's plea, the state previously having tried defendant to conclusion on another charge arising from the same core set of facts giving rise to this charge.

The Appellate Division determined that the Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy was irrelevant, as jeopardy had not attached when the motion for Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment was made, as the jury had not yet been impaneled and sworn. Therefore, the State would have been within its rights to try the defendant on those separate charges.

However, the mandatory joinder rule precluded such a subsequent trial. That rule was adopted to bar separate trials for multiple offenses that are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the first trial begins, when the offenses are based essentially on the same conduct or arise from the same criminal episode and are within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court. This rule is more widely applicable than that barring double jeopardy.

[Note: The court may still order a separate trial for multiple charges when it believes the occasion warrants it due to potential prejudice to either the defendant or the State.]

In this case, the State could not have proceeded to trial on Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment after the dismissal of Count 3 by the court. Therefore, by negotiating the plea agreement with defendant, the State had indirectly accomplished what the mandatory joinder rule prohibits. The defendant was "entitled to be free of the harassment and oppression of a second trial on offenses relating to the same episode."

The Appellate Division further concluded that even had the mandatory joinder rule been inapplicable in this case, the State should have been barred from proceeding on Count 1 by the doctrine of fundamental fairness.

In considering the fairness to defendant, the court examined his reasonable expectations. The letter to defense counsel, followed by the statements made in court describing the State's intention to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 and proceed only on Count 3 with regard to this defendant would lead the defendant to believe that, in proceeding to trial on Count 3, he would not have to face subsequent prosecution on Count 1. Further prosecution would violate the spirit of the mandatory joinder rule and the doctrine of fundamental fairness.

In addition, the court concluded that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, as his attorney should have moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 prior to the entry of a guilty plea by defendant.

The end result: The conviction of the defendant was reversed and the indictment dismissed by the Appellate Division.

What does all of this mean to you? The Appellate Division has reiterated the protection afforded to defendants from multiple trials stemming from the same instance of criminal conduct. Except in instances where the court orders separate trials for separate counts of an indictment, you will be subjected to only one trial, freeing you from the additional stress and expense of facing additional trials at a later date regarding the same indictment.

Miranda Rights and Juveniles

2009-08-20T14:26:00.027-04:00

State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.S., August 12, 2009 - A Discussion

The facts in brief: A 14-year-old girl, A.S. was accused of molesting the 4-year-old grandson of her adoptive mother. Had she been an adult, the acts described would have constituted first-degree aggravated sexual assault. A.S. had been abandoned by her substance-abusing biological mother at the age of nine, and began living with her adoptive mother when she was eleven. She was reading at a third-grade level although she was in high school. She had no prior experience with the police, courts, or legal system.

After a detective with the county prosecutor's office interviewed the victim, A.S. appeared for questioning with her adoptive mother, at which time A.S. confessed to the acts alleged. At trial, the Family Court judge conducted a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of this confession.

From the tape of the interview as well as A.S. testimony during the suppression hearing, the judge learned that the prosecutor had directed A.S.' mother to read to A.S. her Miranda warnings. When A.S. asked what a lawyer would do for her, her mother responded simply, "Suppose to represent you," and then told A.S. that she'd have to talk eventually and that they already knew what she'd done. A.S.' mother, without obtaining the juvenile's consent, told the prosecutor that he could question her. It was only then that A.S. signed the waiver.

When A.S. again asked what an attorney would do on her behalf, her mother and the prosecutor told her that he would represent her and ensure that her rights were not violated, but could not speak for her. She was told by her mother, "When the questions are asked, you have to answer the question" and by the prosecutor, "... you're the only one that can actually speak the truth here." A.S. was not asked again whether she would like to have an attorney; instead, her mother expressed impatience at the delay A.S. was creating and the prosecutor told A.S., "the truth is only gonna help you," and that "an attorney that's an assistant prosecutor was gonna review all this information," and "the more truthful you are and the more complete you are, okay, the better it looks for you, okay."

The two adults proceeded to question her until she confessed to the acts alleged. Throughout, the antagonism of her mother toward A.S. was clear as she repeatedly insisted that A.S. confess to the prosecutor.

During the hearing, A.S. stated that she understood "some of" her rights, and that when she refused to answer questions, she was intending to invoke her right to "remain silent," until she was badgered into responding. She also stated that she never asked for an attorney because they didn't do anything but just "sit there." The judge determined that the confession was indeed admissible, if troubling.

The issues: Was A.S.' waiver of her right to counsel and right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona given knowingly and voluntarily? Did A.S. invoke her right to remain silent?

The court's holding: The Appellate Division determined that the confession, in fact, should not have been admitted into evidence.

In the case of a juvenile, the standards regarding the waiver of Miranda rights are exacting.

As the court discussed, "To admit the confession of a juvenile over the age of fourteen, the State must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statement was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given," based upon factors including the suspect's age, education, intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, repetition and length of questioning, and the suspect's prior encounters with the law. When a juvenile is being interrogated, the role of a parent takes on a special significance. The parent’s role is to support the juvenile and guide her, not to be an additional adversary in an unfamiliar and intimidating setting. The court emphasized the necessity for adult protection with a juvenile suspect.

With regard to A.S. specifically, nothing was done to contribute to her comprehension of her rights, discuss whether waiver was an appropriate course for her to take, or explain to her what the practical effects of a waiver would be.

In addition, A.S.’ long silences suggested that she was indeed attempting to invoke her right to silence, requiring further inquiry from the prosecutor with regard to A.S. wishes, rather than further interrogation. The courts have held that a request by a defendant to terminate an interrogation must be scrupulously honored, no matter how ambiguous, even when the person being questioned is an adult. This requirement imposed by the courts upon prosecutors is all the more important when the suspect is a juvenile.

Most troubling to the court was the evident conflict of interest resulting from A.S.’ mother’s relationship to the victim and her actions in the best interests of her grandson, to the detriment of her adopted daughter. The purpose of a parent’s presence at the interrogation of a juvenile is to provide a buffer between law enforcement and the child. No such buffer was created here.

The facts of this case, reviewed as a whole, rendered A.S.’ confession substantially unfair. The court found that, “In circumstances such as those existing in the present matter, where the adult advisor is known to have a close family relationship to the victim and the alleged perpetrator, the prudent approach would be to require the presence of an attorney capable of advising the juvenile with respect to her rights and her potential culpability.”

The end result: In the end, the Appellate Division did uphold the adjudication of the Family Court. It had no choice, though it was gravely disturbed by the way the confession was handled and the findings of the Family Court judge with regard to its admissibility. The Family Court judge had indicated at trial that even without the confession he would have come to the same findings. It is the job of the Family Court judge to determine credibility, and he found the victim had given enough credible testimony to result in adjudication of A.S. as a delinquent and her registration with Megan's Law. It was not the place of the Appellate Division to dispute those findings.

What does all of this mean to you and your child?: The court has reiterated the great importance of protecting the rights of all defendants, but especially those of juveniles.

Certainly, if you have a conflict of interest with regard to a child in your care who has been arrested, it would be in the best interests of all concerned for you to obtain representation for the child to preserve his or her rights before any questioning begins. Failing to do so would merely drag out the process, harming the victim, harming the juvenile defendant, and increasing the expense.

If, as in most cases, you do not have a conflict of interest and are truly interested in protecting your child, do not allow him or her to be questioned without legal representation. If you cannot afford it, know that a public defender must be appointed on his or her behalf. Even if you can afford it, if there is no time given to you to to obtain private representation prior to initial questioning, a public defender must be assigned to protect your child. If you can obtain private representation, do so.

Prosecutors and police officers will always do all that is in their power to convince their suspect to waive his or her rights to counsel and silence and to confess; juveniles are treated no differently than adults in this. While they are not permitted to trample the rights of you or of your child, they will always, always tell you that it is in your child's best interest to talk, that the child would be helping himself and that they are there to help.

It is when they convince you of this, when you agree to permit your child to talk to the police or prosecutor unrepresented, that the defense attorney eventually retained to represent your child has the most difficult job ahead. It decreases the likelihood that your attorney can help, it decreases the likelihood that you will see a positive outcome to your child's case, and it increases the danger that your child will be adjudicated a delinquent and face the most severe types of punishment.

Oh, really?

2009-08-13T19:21:00.010-04:00

According to a recent article in the New York Daily news (Original Source Here), not only do 70% of Americans think that it is right for a woman to take her husband's name upon marriage, but a full fifty percent actually think it should be required by law. Of the ones who favor the name change, some of them voiced the reasoning "that women should lose their own identity when they marry and become a part of the man and his family."

What?

Now, I recognize that only 815 people were surveyed. I also recognize that statistical data can easily be manipulated by those asking the questions, and that we have no indication that this was an accurate cross-section of all Americans. Still, the statistic is disturbing.

For the sake of perspective, I was married in March and I changed my name from Pelc to Symbouras. However, I knew that I had the choice, and that the choice was mine alone. My husband never even brought up the issue; I did, and his reaction was, "I'm happy that you want to take my name, but it's entirely up to you. I'd never push it." It is for this reason, this recognition of choice above all, that I absolutely did not lose my identity.

As someone who was planning a wedding, I frequented wedding-related websites and was in contact with other women across the country and around the world who were also getting married. Every once in a while the question would be posed regarding a marital name change, and the responses were interesting. Many women, especially in New Jersey, are choosing to keep their premarital surnames. Many are changing them entirely as I did, hyphenating them, or dropping their middle names, bumping their maiden name to middle name status. Many, to my surprise, relayed their fiance's insistence that they change their names. Raised, as I was, to be independent and fairly opinionated, that surprised me. It grates on me.

This is 2009, after all. Women are, in the legal world, equals. Sure, there's still much more to gain in the real world, but our predecessors have fought long and hard for our equality and to a large extent have achieved it. Born in 1970, I was raised with the perspective that I could do anything I pleased with my life; that there was nothing I could not achieve, no career I could not pursue. We vote. We serve on juries. We seek educations. We run companies. We create, invent, achieve.

And still... we need to lose our own identities? No. No, we don't.